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Abstract—Future autonomous vehicles will generate, collect,
aggregate and consume significant volumes of data as key gateway
devices in emerging Internet of Things scenarios. While vehicles
are widely accepted as one of the most challenging mobility
contexts in which to achieve effective data communications, less
attention has been paid to the privacy of data emerging from
these vehicles. The quality and usability of such privatized data
will lie at the heart of future safe and efficient transportation
solutions.
In this paper, we present the XYZ Privacy mechanism. XYZ
Privacy is to our knowledge the first such mechanism that enables
data creators to submit multiple contradictory responses to a
query, whilst preserving utility measured as the absolute error
from the actual original data. The functionalities are achieved
in both a scalable and secure fashion. For instance, individual
location data can be obfuscated while preserving utility, thereby
enabling the scheme to transparently integrate with existing
systems (e.g. Waze). A new cryptographic primitive Function
Secret Sharing is used to achieve non-attributable writes and
we show an order of magnitude improvement from the default
implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers are becoming increasingly interested in study-
ing smart city activities and interactions, such as pedestrians,
drivers and traffic, city resources (e.g., energy) and city envi-
ronment (e.g., pollution, noise). These studies are commonly
based on Open Shared Data made available by several Smart
City testbeds around the country. To this end, Open Data
Science enables researchers to collect the data, analyze and
process it with Data Mining and Machine Learning techniques
and create accurate models that allow them to credibly validate
smart city design methodologies.
There is a growing demand for researchers and manufac-
turers to deploy their technologies in real vehicles, roads and
cities. Rather than requiring each stakeholder working in the
area to create new solutions for securing their experimental or
vehicular infrastructure, we propose a highly scalable, com-
mon “privacy” infrastructure that enables the non-attributable
dissemination of data, whilst simultaneously conserving and
preserving the critical information content properties required
for value added service provision by aggregators and upstream
analysts.
As smart city experiments are frequently performed on
massive scale with public participants, it is prudent to surmise
that some may seek to exploit the data for illicit purposes.
Publicly releasing data with exact answers to queries (without
sanitization) has resulted in numerous privacy violations and
attacks, e.g., relating to unintentional medical data disclosure
of high profile governors [34], shutdowns of seemingly in-
nocuous open data machine learning competitions [22], loca-
tion tracking attacks and DoS attacks [36], and unintentional
sharing of mobility patterns of high profile US citizens with
foreign governments [31].
k-anonymity introduced by Sweeney in 1998 [34] was
among the first privacy techniques to address publicly releasing
data in a privacy-preserving manner. Roughly speaking, k-
anonymity seeks to blend a single data owner’s personal
attribute with at least k other data owners such that the single
data owner is indistinguishable from k−1 other data owners.
For example, if a particular data owner’s record reporting a
particular disease is publicly released with 1000 other data
owners records with the same disease, the data owner is
indistinguishable from 999 other data owners.
However, there are known impossibility results for attempts
to preserve privacy while releasing exact answers. Dinur and
Nissim showed in 2003 that it is impossible to reveal exact
aggregation information while simultaneously preserving pri-
vacy (against a polynomial adversary) [10]. Thus, perturbation
must be injected in order to guarantee privacy (privacy defined
as an adversary is unable to determine the value of a targeted
individual with a probability greater than 50%) [10]. Alterna-
tively, noiseless privacy has been proposed which does not add
additional privacy noise. However, noiseless privacy requires
strong adversary assumptions such as the adversary has limited
or no auxiliary information and is restrictive regarding multiple
queries and composability [2]. Thus, in order to have Open
Shared Data, on Smart City or larger scale, there will be some
notion of absolute error or distance from the ground truth due
to the required perturbation.
Differential privacy is one such privacy definition which
enables realisation of this concept, and it is currently viewed
as the gold standard. Roughly speaking, differential privacy
says that the ability of an adversary to inflict harm should be
essentially independent of whether any individual opts in to or
out of, the dataset [13]. Thus, a data owner may safely utilise
differential privacy techniques when sharing their personal
data, as it enables them control insight into their personal
information.
The Laplace mechanism satisfies differential privacy by
adding privacy noise independent of the database size [15]
by drawing privacy noise from the Laplace distribution. The
Laplace mechanism is calibrated to the max difference be-
tween any two rows in the database. That is, the noise is
sufficient to protect the max leakage that any particular data
owner induces. For example, first a service aggregates all the
data owners truthful responses. Then, the aggregation service
draws from the Laplace distribution by calibrating the variance
according to the desired privacy strength. Drawing from other
distributions such as Gaussian also satisfies differential privacy,
though the Laplace mechanism provides differential privacy
and Gaussian provides (ε,δ )-differential privacy [16].
Now, consider if the Laplace mechanism is used and we
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desire to improve the privacy strength. The privacy strength of
a given mechanism is determined by the epsilon ε value, which
corresponds to the privacy loss measured as the ratio of the
max difference between any two differing outputs. Naturally,
it follows that increasing the value of ε adds privacy noise
mitigating any utility benefits as the privacy noise increases.
Another observation is that the use of the Laplace mecha-
nism requires each individual to truthfully respond, relying on
the output perturbation to provide privacy. This requires extra
caution in the sensitive queries posed. For example, suppose
we query everyone at the Brooklyn Bridge to understand how
many people are currently at the Brooklyn Bridge. Regardless
of the cryptographic technique or privacy mechanism used, the
act of responding signals to an adversary that the data owner
was indeed at the Brooklyn Bridge.
In this paper, we present the XYZ Privacy mechanism.
XYZ Privacy achieves scalable privacy. The queried pop-
ulation is increased beyond those merely at the Brooklyn
Bridge, say to the entire New York City metropolitan area.
At the same time, the absolute error is preserved and does
not increase or expand due to the distortion of the underlying
truthful population distribution (e.g., the query distorts and
decreases the truthful percentage from 100% of data owners
at the Brooklyn Bridge to less than 1% of the New York City
population at the Brooklyn Bridge). Additionally, in our XYZ
Privacy mechanism, data owners perform cryptographic private
writes which dissociate the identifier from the data value. The
aggregation operators also perform MPC to protect against
malicious data owners that try to corrupt the aggregate answer.
We evaluate the scalability and accuracy of our privacy-
preserving approach utilizing a vehicular crowdsourcing sce-
nario comprising of approximately one million records. In this
dataset, each vehicle reports its location utilizing the California
Transportation Dataset from magnetic pavement sensors (see
Section §VIII-A). To demonstrate the efficiency and scalability
of our approach, we crowdsource and privately write 128,000
vehicle (data owner) locations in under a minute with a key
size of less than 15KB, a square root reduction compared to the
trivial solution whose key size would be linear in the number
of data owners (i.e., the key size is the number of data owners
times the message bit size). This key size reduction allows us
to increase the database size to simultaneously accommodate
hundreds of thousands of data owners.
This work demonstrates, for the first time, that per-
sonal data can be crowdsourced at scale with constant er-
ror(preserving the information content of interest to upstream
aggregators and analysts), strong privacy guarantees, protected
with scalable cryptographic private writes, and accurately
disclosed. We believe this represents an exciting new contri-
bution to open data science, driven by the need for privacy-
preserving crowdsourcing in mobile cloud contexts (e.g., traffic
management).
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy Definitions. Differential privacy [12], [15], [14], [16]
has been proposed as a privacy definition such that anything
that can be learned if a particular data owner is added to
the database could have also been learned before the data
owner was added. A data owner is thus “safe” to participate
as statistical inferences amongst the aggregate are learned yet
specific information regarding the individual is not learned.
However, careful consideration needs to be done when
applying differentially private mechanism in practice. There is
a drawback to the Laplace mechanism in graph datasets such as
social networks [20], [19] or vehicle commuting patterns. Even
if a particular data owner does not participate, their friends that
do participate leak information that can be used to deprivatize
the targeted data owner (e.g., shadow profiles). For example, it
is possible to learn political beliefs or sexual orientation even
if a particular individual does not participate and maintain
an active profile in an online social network. An adversary
simply needs to analyze the similarity metrics amongst the
social circles that a data owner participates in to understand
politics beliefs or sexual orientation [32], [21], [29], [26], [23].
Furthermore, if the graph structures of the social network
are eventually anonymized and released, an adversary simply
needs to participate and influence the graph structure (e.g.,
joining a social network) to learn and influence the actual
social graph before it’s privatized and released. Thus, there
needs to be a mechanism which also perturbs the underlying
structure of the data itself and preserves accuracy as the
underlying distribution structure becomes distorted.
Sampling can be applied to weaken the associations within
a graph structure. This is achieved whereby responses are
randomly discarded in order to reduce the the graph depen-
dencies leaked by a targeted individuals connections. The
severed connections reduces the social circle size and makes
it challenging for the adversary to make similarity inferences
from reduced social circles alone. Thus, it has been shown that
the strength of privacy mechanisms are increased by applying
sampling and reducing the privacy leakage [30], [24], [27],
[19].
Another popular technique which satisfies differential pri-
vacy is the randomized response mechanism, originally pro-
posed in the 1960s [37], [18]. Randomized response has
been shown to be optimal in the local differentially private
model [11] and is used by many companies today (e.g.,
Apple, Google [17]) due to its simplicity while satisfying the
differential privacy guarantee.
However, these protocols, such as Rappor [17], require an
inordinate amount of samples, yet still do not preserve utility.
For example, even if 1 billion reports are collected, statistics
from close to 1 million reports may not show up in the analysis.
Thus, these type of local differentially private protocols are
best suited for tracking heavy-hitters (e.g., counting the most
commonly occurring elements in peaky power-law distribu-
tions) [3]. We elaborate further in Section IV-C.
Some protocols which leverage randomized response style
mechanisms have made assumptions that the majority of the
underlying truthful population truthfully responds “Yes” (e.g.,
the percentage is greater than 2/3 or 3/4) in order to preserve
accuracy. However, it’s not clear what privacy guarantees will
be provided as any adversary is able to successfully guess with
greater than 50% probability the value of any data owner in
such a population. For example, suppose our query is how
many home owners reside within 15 blocks from the beach,
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yet we ask only those home owners within 20 blocks from the
beach.
Zero-knowledge privacy [20] is a cryptographically influ-
enced privacy definition that is strictly stronger than differential
privacy. Crowd-blending privacy [19] is weaker than differ-
ential privacy; however, with a pre-sampling step, satisfies
both differential privacy and zero-knowledge privacy. However,
these mechanisms are suited for the centralized system model
and rely on aggressive sampling, which significantly degrades
the accuracy estimations.
Distributional privacy [4] is a privacy mechanism which
says that the released aggregate information only reveals the
underlying ground truth distribution and nothing more. Each
data owner is protected by the randomness of the other
randomly selected data owners rather than by adding explicit
privacy noise to the output. The indistinguishability from the
underlying distribution protects individual data owners and
is strictly stronger than differential privacy. However, it is
computationally inefficient though can work over a large class
of queries known as Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension.
Other location based privacy approaches perturb a data
owner’s true location by randomly selecting a coordinate
within some allowable range [1]. However, these radius per-
turbation based approaches face the same underlying limits as
the Laplace mechanism. Increasing the allowable radius range
clearly improves privacy strength, yet fundamentally the there
is no underlying utility (the absolute error as measured from
the ground truth).
Sampling. Sampling whereby a centralized aggregator ran-
domly discards responses has been previously formulated as a
mechanism to amplify privacy [9], [30], [24], [27], [19]. The
intuition is that when sampling approximates the original ag-
gregate information, an attacker is unable to distinguish when
sampling is performed and which data owners are sampled.
These privacy mechanisms range from sampling without a
sanitization mechanism, sampling to amplify a differentially
private mechanism, sampling that tolerates a bias, and even
sampling a weaker privacy notion such as k-anonymity to
amplify the privacy guarantees.
However, sampling alone has several issues. First, data
owners are not protected by plausible deniability as data
owners do not respond “No”. Second, the estimation of the
underlying truthful “Yes” responses quickly degrades as we
increase the population that truthfully responds “No”.
Multi-party Computation. Multi-party computation (MPC) is
a secure computation model whereby parties jointly compute a
function such that each party only learns the aggregate output
and nothing more. However, MPC mechanisms that release
the exact answer has no strong privacy guarantees against
active privacy attacks, particularly when the data is publicly
published.
A participant that does not perturb their responses and
provides their exact answer is easily attacked by an adversary
that knows the values of n− 1 participants. For example, an
adversary first runs a counting query that includes all n data
owners and then runs a second counting query over n− 1
data owners (the targeted data owner is the excluded row).
Subtracting the two results reveals the value of the targeted
data owner.
In contrast, the differential privacy model assumes a strong
adversary that knows the n− 1 data owner values. In this
paper we combine MPC and differential privacy by introducing
a sampling-based privacy mechanism that maintains constant
error and show a performance optimization for a new crypto-
graphic primitive named Function Secret Sharing [5].
Private Data Upload. Wang et al. [35] employed and ex-
tended the function secret sharing primitive to enable efficient
private information retrieval operations that protect the data
owner’s queries from being learned by the database servers.
They proposed an optimization by using the Matyas-Meyer-
Oseas one-way compression function as an alternative to the
heavy AES operations for the two party case. Wang et al.
achieves a 2.5x speedup by utilizing one-way compression
functions. However, our XYZ Privacy also demonstrates a one
order of magnitude improvement over the default implementa-
tion of the function secret sharing protocol for the multi-party
database aggregator scenario.
Private Stream Aggregation. Private stream aggregation has
been proposed whereby each data owner locally encrypts
with their own individual key and adds differentially private
noise in a distributed manner [33]. However, these protocols
have two fundamental concerns. First, they are not capable
of operating in the mobile (e.g., vehicular) environment as
the aggregator must collect the encrypted values from each
data owner. A single missing encrypted value will completely
halt the protocol as the aggregator relies on the sum of the
encrypted values in order to decrypt the aggregated sum. Our
protocol is able to operate in the mobile environment and
can safely disregard incomplete data owner uploads. Second,
these protocols rely on a distributed form of Laplace noise.
This means they have the same limitations as described earlier
where increasing the privacy noise mitigates any potential
utility. Our XYZ Privacy mechanism is able to improve privacy
while preserving utility.
III. THREAT MODEL
The attack: an adversary can utilize the database size
(number of participants) to deduce if a particular individual
is included. However, the exact population (database) size or
exact number of participating data owners is not published or
released. This mitigates auxiliary attacks whereby the adver-
sary uses the exact counts to reconstruct the database.
The attack: an adversary can individually inspect the re-
sponses of each data owner to ascertain their truthful response.
However, we select sampling probabilities less than 50%
so that an adversary does not gain an inference advantage
of greater than 50%. We also require a distributed set of
aggregators whereby at least one honest aggregator does not
collude with the others (e.g., a privacy watchdog like the EFF).
The attack: only a single honest data owner (or very few
data owners less than k) participate allowing an adversary
to easily deprivatize the honest data owner. However, the
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aggregation parties proceed in epochs where they only combine
their results if at least k data owners (a threshold that can
be configured) participate. The honest aggregation party may
refuse to share their results with the other aggregation parties
thereby halting the protocol, if the number of participating data
owners is below the desired threshold.
Differential Privacy Guarantee. The protocol we propose is
a 2 round protocol. However, it is 2 rounds in the sense that 2
different values are uploaded by a single data owner. However,
these values are not able to be linked to each other due to the
cryptographic private write in Section VI.
The attack: a network adversary attempts to drop the upload
of the 2nd round, in order to isolate the value of a single data
owner in round 1 to deprivatize the data owner and learn their
truthful value. However, round 1 and round 2 are sent as a tuple
〈round1,round2〉, so if any round is dropped by the network
adversary both rounds are dropped.
Pollution Attacks. In this work we consider three different
pollution attacks : 1) a malicious data owner who attempts to
corrupt the private write by attempting to write to multiple
rows of the database instead of a single row 2) a malicious
data owner who answers a query with a single, large value in
order to inflate the aggregate sum 3) a malicious data owner
who repeatedly answers a query within a single epoch. More
details can be found in ??.
In order for the aggregators to safely accept a particular
data owner’s contribution, each share must be verified to be
only write to a single row, i.e. the shares should resolve to unit
vectors. The aggregators perform multi-party computation for
each data owner in order to verify the FSS shares. We utilize
recent constructions in FSS verification that do not rely on any
public-key primitives [6].
The observation is the following: the dot product of
any unit vector with itself is one, while the dot product
of a non-unit vector is the square of the magnitude. The
data owners submit blinded shares to each aggregator and
then compute over the blinded shares so that the actual unit
vector (i.e. data owner actual response) is not revealed. The
aggregators perform an MPC to verify that the dot product of
the blinded shares with itself evaluates to one, ensuring that
the shares are properly formed. As long as there is at least
one honest aggregation party, no aggregator learns which
database row is written to. Invalid FSS shares can be quickly
XORed out of the intermediate results once they are detected.
Further details of the scheme can be found in the Section VII.
IV. WARM UP CONSTRUCTION
Let us consider first a warm up scenario whereby each
data owner privatized their truthful response utilizing the
randomized response privacy mechanism and then privately
uploads with an information theoretic guarantee.
First, we explain how we discretize real-numbered values
to integers. We then formally describe the randomized response
mechanism. Then, we describe the information-theoretic pri-
vate upload mechanism. Finally, we integrate both techniques
Figure 1. Location Discretization. Each location (latitude,longitude) is
discretized to a location identifier which corresponds to a 0.25 square mile
block. London Bridge corresponds to location ID 8.
and show the limitations, in particular, constant error is not
maintained as the non-truthful population increases. In addi-
tion, the information-theoretic private upload requires a keysize
on the order of the database size making it prohibitively
expensive for hundreds of thousands of data owners. We
motivate the need for a more sophisticated sampling based
privacy mechanism (the XYZ Privacy mechanism) and more
sophisticated techniques for cryptographic compression.
A. Goal
Our primary goal is to enable large scale private query-
ing of the population utilizing sampling mechanisms while
maintaining constant error. For example, suppose we query
the number of vehicles on a busy stretch of the highway. We
could query only those at a particular stretch of the highway.
However, we would know the stretch of the highway location
of any participating data owner. Thus, the privacy protection
is quite limited regardless of any perturbation performed for
this particular query.
The privacy protection would be improved if we query ev-
eryone in the city. The additional data owners provide plausible
deniability by increasing the potential pool of candidates that
sometimes respond “Yes” indicating they are at the particular
stretch of highway. Now, if we know that someone participated
in the query all we can immediately deduce is they are
“somewhere” in the city.
More generally, let Yespop refer to the truthful “Yes”
fraction of the population and Nopop refer to the truthful “No”
fraction of the population. We seek to increase the Nopop by
expanding the query to include more participating data owners.
This results in lowering the percentage of the Yespop. Using
the previous example, querying only those at the particular
stretch of the highway would result in the Yespop being 100%.
Expanding the query to the city would reduce this percentage
to say 5% or even 1% or lower.
Query. The query is posted on the web. Data owners period-
ically check the web and download the query. The query is
persistent and is set to expire days or weeks in the future.
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B. Discretization
We illustrate the scheme using location coordinate data,
although the discretization scheme can be employed for all real
valued data. Suppose a data owner currently on London Bridge
participates in the protocol. First, the location is discretized to
a location identifier (ID) as seen in Figure 1. For example,
using a 16 bit identifier provides 65,536 possible locations,
which covers a 64 x 64 mile square with 0.25 mile sections
for a total of 4,096 square miles. For comparison Paris is 41
square miles, London is 607 square miles, New York City is
305 square miles [38]. In Figure 1, London Bridge corresponds
to location ID 8.
C. Sampling Error
We now examine how the Randomized Response [37],
[18] mechanism grows in error as the Nopop increases. We
first formally describe the Randomized Response mechanism
and then describe how the sampling error increases with the
population. We will later show in Section V how to preserve
the utility.
(Randomized Response) We use two independent and biased
coins. Let pi1 and pi2 refer to the heads probabilities of the
first and second biased coin toss respectively. The coin toss
parameters are published publicly while the number of data
owners is private and needs to be estimated.
Privatized ValueYes =

1 with probability
pi1+(1−pi1)×pi2
0 otherwise
(1)
That is, the Yespop subpopulation responds “Yes” with
probability pi1+(1−pi1)×pi2. Otherwise they respond “No”.
Privatized ValueNo =

1 with probability
(1−pi1)×pi2
0 otherwise
(2)
That is, the Nopop subpopulation responds “Yes” with
probability (1−pi1)×pi2. Otherwise they respond “No”.
(Expected Value) We now formulate the expected value in
order to carry out the estimation of the underlying population.
The expected value of those that respond ‘1’ (i.e., privatized
“Yes”) is the sum of the binomial distribution of each subpop-
ulation.
E[1] = pi1×Yespop +(1−pi1)×pi2× (Yespop +Nopop) (3)
(Estimator) We solve for Yespop by the following. Let the
aggregated privatized count E[1] defined in Equation 3 be
denoted as Private Sum.
Yespop =
Private Sum− (1−pi1)×pi2× (Yespop+Nopop)
pi1
(4)
That is, we first subtract from Private Sum of the “privacy
noise”. We then divide by the first flip pi1 which is the sampling
parameter which determines how frequently a data owner
truthfully responds “Yes” from the Yespop subpopulation.
(Sampling Error) Suppose published parameters of the coin
tosses are configured independently with pi1 = 0.85, pi2 = 0.3
and 100 data owners. We estimate the underlying “Yes” truth-
ful population using Equation 4 by aggregating the privatized
responses from all data owners, subtracting the expected value
of (1−0.85)×0.3×100 and dividing by 0.8 1.
However, a drawback to the randomized response mecha-
nism is that the estimation error quickly increases with the
population size due to the underlying truthful distribution
distortion. For example, say we are interested in how many
vehicles are at a popular stretch of the highway. Say we
configure pi1 = 0.85 and pi2 = 0.3. We query 10,000 vehicles
asking for their current location and only 100 vehicles are
at the particular area we are interested in (i.e., 1% of the
population truthfully responds “Yes”). The standard deviation
due to the privacy noise will be 21 2 which is slightly tolerable.
However, a query over one million vehicles (now only 0.01%
of the population truthfully responds “Yes”) will incur a
standard deviation of 212. The estimate of the ground truth
(100) will incur a large absolute error when the aggregated
privatized responses are two or even three standard deviations
(i.e., 95% or 99% of the time) away from the expected value, as
the mechanism subtracts only the expected value of the noise.
We desire better calibration over the privacy mechanism
and a mechanism which maintains constant error as the Nopop
population scales up. We introduce the XYZ Privacy mecha-
nism in the next section. Though first, we examine how to
ensure that data owners are able to privately upload their
responses.
D. Private Upload
Now consider that we would like to write into a database
without any of the database operators learning which row we
wrote into. Knowledge of the row and thus data uploaded by
the owner would allow the operator to track the owner over
subsequent epochs even if the data is privatized.
We assume a distributed database setting such that, so
long as one database operator remains honest and does not
collude with other database operators, it is not possible to learn
which database row was written into (as long as there are at
least two data owners participating). The data owner should
continuously re-select a new database row at random every
epoch.
(Two Party) Let us first consider two operators and two
databases. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Assume the database is represented by n rows. Each data
owner uploads a message of size m bits, in a randomly chosen
row. Without loss of generality, for our example we describe
1For instance with a 60% truthful population, the answer to the first toss is
0.6×0.85= 0.51 and the answer to the second toss is (1−0.85)×0.3= 0.045
2(
√
(1−0.85)×0.3×10,000)
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Information Theoretic Private Write
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 3 0
Anonymity set size=3
Query: Which location ID are you at?
1 3 1
Two people 
at Eiffel 
Tower
Eiffel Tower
Nancy 
Gare
3 0 1
Aggregator K
Aggregator E
2 0 0
1 3 1
1 4 2
0 1 3
0 4 0
0 4 0
Generate random bits (key K) and 
sum with answer (encrypted data E). 
Send K and E
K
K
K
E
E
E
Keys go to 
Aggregator K 
Encrypted data go to 
Aggregator E
3 0 1
1 4 2
0 4 0
2 0 0
0 1 3
0 4 0
4 3 3
2 0 3
Each Aggregator 
sums the others 
results
Eiffel Tower
Finite field 5
Figure 2. Each data owner uniformly at random selects a slot to write
their location ID. The aggregators are unable to determine which data
owner wrote to a particular slot, as long as there is one honest aggregator
who does not collude. The aggregate count of each location ID is computed
as the final step.
now we assume m is one bit. Thus the database is a bitstring.
Extending to a message size of more than one bit would only
require a larger finite field (instead of finite field size 2 we
could choose a prime number larger than the desired message
size in bits).
Each data owner begins with a bitstring of length n (the
size of the database). The data owner uniformly at random
selects an index of the bitstring and sets its message value
(assume it is to 1). Every other index is set to 0.
Next, the data owner creates a key by generating a random
bitstring of length n.
The data owner then XORs the randomly generated bit-
string key with the bitstring containing the message (that has
only one index set) to produce the encrypted bitstring.
The data owner then transmits the encrypted bitstring
to one database operator and the key bitstring to the other
database operator. The data owner may randomly decide which
database operator to send the encrypted and key bitstrings.
The same process repeats for each data owner. That is, a
second data owner repeats the process of uniformly at random
selecting an index of the bitstring to set to 1, generating a key
bitstring, and encrypting the bitstring.
As the database operators receive each bitstring (either en-
crypted or key bitstring), each database operator cumulatively
XORs the bitstrings.
Finally, at the end of an agreed epoch, the database opera-
tors share the cumulatively XORed bitstrings with each other.
By doing so, they are able to reconstruct a database consisting
of each data owners message at their specified indexes. The
privacy guarantee is that the database operators are unable to
determine which data owner wrote to which index, as long
as there are at least two participating data owners and there
is at least one database operator that does not collude with
any other. (There is also an assumption that the data owners
do not write to the same index, though collisions can be
probabilistically avoided by sizing the database large enough
to minimize the likelihood of collisions).
(Multi-party) Now, to generalize the 2 database operators to
Z database operators, the protocol proceeds as follows.
The data owner has a bitstring of length n. The data owner
uniformly at random selects the index of the bitstring to write
to and sets the value to 1. Every other index is set to 0.
Next, the data owner generates Z−1 random bitstrings of
length n. These bitstrings serve as the “virtual” single key.
The data owner cumulatively XORs the Z−1 bitstring keys
with the bitstring containing the message (where only index is
set) to produce the encrypted bitstring.
The data owner transmits each separate bitstring key to
a different database operator and the encrypted bitstring to
the other database operator. The data owner may randomly
decide which database operator to send the encrypted and key
bitstrings.
The multi-party protocol then proceeds the same as the
previous two database operator case. Each database operator
cumulatively XORs the received bitstrings and then shares
the cumulative XOR results with each other to reconstruct
the database. The privacy guarantee holds that each database
operator is unable to determine which data owner wrote to
which index, as long as there are at least two participating
data owners and there is at least one database operator that
does not collude with any other.
(Key Size) The issue is that the key size is the length of the
database n. Suppose the number of data owners is on the order
of millions and the database row size is several hundred bits.
The bitstring size will be of the order of several hundred MBs,
which is prohibitively expensive for mobile devices and edge
networks continually uploading every few minutes.
We could compress each of the key bitstrings by using a
pseudorandom generator (PRG) for the Z-1 keys. However, we
somehow must compress the bitstring containing the message
(that has only one index set). Unfortunately, by definition of
a PRG, it is computationally difficult to generate a PRG seed
that expands to the desired bitstring. We must utilize a more
sophisticated approached to enable cryptographic compression
of the bitstring. We utilize a new primitive named Function
Secret Sharing (FSS) [5] and show a performance optimization
by selective choice of the parameters in Section VI.
V. XYZ PRIVACY MECHANISM
We now describe our XYZ Privacy mechanism that
achieves constant error even where the population which does
not truthfully respond “Yes” (Nopop) increases. We illus-
trate the scheme using location coordinate data, although the
scheme can be employed for all real valued data.
Illustration. To illustrate and demonstrate the XYZ Pri-
vacy mechanism, we employ the following example. Suppose
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we are interested in the distribution of vehicles across London.
We query every vehicle in London asking for their location
coordinates. Each data owner responds to a binary version of
the binary query such as “Are you at the London Bridge?”.
The mechanism has two rounds and proceeds as follows.
Suppose a particular data owner is at London Bridge.
First, the location is discretized to a location identifier (ID)
as described in Section IV-B. In this case the location ID is 8
as shown in Figure 1.
Next, the data owner tosses a multi-sided die. One side
samples whether the data owner should respond truthfully for
their location ID. The remaining sides selects a location ID
for the data owner to respond.
Suppose in the first round the data owner is sampled and
selected. The data owner should respond “Yes” (they are at
London Bridge).
In the second round the sampled data owner should abstain
from responding at all.
A privatized sum is computed by aggregating the “Yes”
counts in each round.
Finally, estimation occurs by subtracting the privatized sum
in round one from round two and dividing by the sampling
parameter.
The following three privacy observations are made. First, a
majority of the population provides privacy noise by randomly
responding either “Yes” or “No” regardless of their truthful
response. Second, plausible deniability is provided as each
data owner probabilistically responds opposite of their truthful
response. Finally, every data owner acts as a potential candidate
for the truthful population. Our assumption is that every data
owner is active in both rounds and only the aggregate counts
are released.
A. Binary Value
We now formally introduce the binary value XYZ Pri-
vacy mechanism whereby a data owner responds either “No”
or “Yes”, either 0 or 1 respectively.
(Round One) In the first round each data owner tosses a three
sided die with probabilities pis, piYes, and piNo. Let pis be the
probability that a data owner truthfully responds. Otherwise,
regardless of their truthful response let piYes be the probability
that a data owner randomly responds “Yes” and piNo be the
probability that a data owner randomly responds “No”.
Round OneYes =

1 with probability pis
1 with probability piYes
0 with probability piNo
(5)
Round OneNo =

1 with probability piYes
0 with probability pis
0 with probability piNo
(6)
At this point, privacy noise has been added and thus the
underlying truthful distribution is becoming distorted as the
number of non-truthful data owners participate. The distortion
makes it difficult to estimate the the underlying truthful distri-
bution as we have one equation and two variables (number of
truthful and non-truthful data owners).
Thus, we execute a second round while fixing the two
variables enabling us to solve for the truthful population
estimate.
(Round Two) In the second round only the data owner
which was selected and sampled with probability pis does not
participate (effectively writes 0). The remaining data owners
stay with the responses from round one.
Round Two =

∅ with probability pis
1 with probability piYes
0 with probability piNo
(7)
Now combining the second round with the first round we
obtain accurate estimations as we see below.
(Expected Values) We now formulate the expected values as
follows. The subscript refers to the round number. That is, 11
refers to output 1 and round 1. The first round of expected
values are:
E[11] = piYes×TOTALpop+pis×Yespop
E[01] = piNo×TOTALpop+pis×Nopop (8)
That is, both the Yespop and Nopop contribute both “Yes”
and “No” responses while a small subpopulation responds
truthfully.
The second round of expected values are:
E[12] = piYes×TOTALpop
E[02] = piNo×TOTALpop (9)
That is, the small subpopulation from round 1 samples out
and does not participate (effectively writes 0). The remaining
data owners randomly respond “Yes” or “No” while remaining
at their round one responses.
(Estimator) We solve for the Yespop population by subtracting
round one by round two as follows. Let Private Sum“Yes”,1 refer
to the aggregated privatized counts for output space “Yes” and
round 1.
Yespop =
Private Sum“Yes”,1−Private Sum“Yes”,2
pis
(10)
That is, we subtract the privatized sum of output space
“Yes” round 1 from the output space “Yes” of round 2. The
result is the sampled “Yes” aggregate. We then obtain the
estimation by dividing by the sampling parameter.
The sampling error affects only the Yespop as seen in
Equation 32. Thus we are able to scale the Nopop yet retain
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constant error. Plausible deniability is provided as each data
owner may respond to either output space based on the coin
toss parameters.
B. Multiple (Simultaneous) Values
We now examine how to privatize the multiple choice
scenario whereby there are multiple values and the data owner
should select a single value. We extend the binary value
mechanism defined in the previous section. Multiple values
are applicable to most real-world scenarios (as opposed to
the binary value mechanism). The location coordinate grid
scenario, explained in Section IV-B and illustrated in Figure 1,
explains a scenario where there are multiple locations (i.e.,
location IDs) and the data owner is currently at a single
location ID. Recall that the data owner’s truthful response is
discretized to an integer value greater than 0.
However, we desire more than simply randomizing multi-
ple choices. The XYZ Privacy mechanism has each data owner
respond with multiple, simultaneous, and contradictory re-
sponses while maintaining constant error. For example, if there
are 9 locations, each data owner probabilistically responds they
may be in 9 locations simultaneously.
Suppose a particular data owner is at the London Bridge.
The first round proceeds as follows. For the location they are
currently at (e.g., London Bridge) the data owner flips a biased
coin and if heads responds truthfully. When queried about
other locations the data owner randomly also responds they
are at the location.
Say the particular data owner from Figure 1 was sampled
and selected. Their response should be with location ID 8. In
addition, say they were selected for location IDs 1,2,4,5. Thus,
the round one response would be 1,2,4,5,8.
In the second round, the data owner should not respond
they are at the London Bridge. The remaining responses stay.
Thus, the round two response would be 1,2,4,5.
A privatized sum is computed by aggregating the location
ID counts in each round.
The estimated count for each location ID value is then
calculated by subtracting the privatized sum of the second
round from the first round and then dividing by the sampling
parameter.
There are several privacy observations. Similar to the
binary value scenario in Section V-A, both privacy noise and
plausible deniability is provided. However, now a data owner
responds with multiple contradictory responses claiming to
be in multiple locations at once. At the same time in the
second round, all selected and sampled data owners across
every location will silently not participate. Every data owner
now blends with every other data owner.
We now formally describe the multiple (simultaneous)
values XYZ Privacy mechanism.
(Round One) Let V represent all outputs for which the data
owner does not truthfully respond “Yes”. Let V ′ be the special
output for which the data owner truthfully responds “Yes”.
In the first round the data owner should truthfully respond
according to the sampling parameter only for their truthful
output value. For all other values the data owner randomly
responds regardless of their truthful value.
Round One =

V ′ with probability pis
V,V ′ with probability piV
0 with probability 1−piV −pis
(11)
That is, a data owner responds with multiple contradictory
responses.
(Round Two) In the second round all data owners stay with
their round one response and respond randomly regardless
of their underlying truthful response. All the data owners
that were sampled and selected to respond truthfully do not
participate in the second round.
Round Two =

∅ with probability pis
V,V ′ with probability piV
0 with probability 1−piV −pis
(12)
That is, all truthful responses equally fall out from the
equation.
(Expected Values) The first round of expected values are as
follows.
E[V1] = piV ×TOTAL+pis×Yespop (13)
That is, for each value both populations randomly con-
tribute, with a small percentage contributing by responding
truthfully.
The second round of expected values are all the same
regardless of the underlying truthful response:
E[V2] = piV ×TOTAL (14)
That is, everyone randomly contributes. The sampled and
selected percentage that truthfully responded in round one do
not participate (effectively write 0) and respond now in round
two.
(Estimator) To solve for the YES population we subtract the
second round from the first round and iterate for each output
value as follows:
YES =
Private Sum“Yes”,1−Private Sum“Yes”,2
pis
(15)
The sampled and selected population, by not participating
in round two (effectively write 0), allows us to baseline the
privacy noise and perform estimation for the sampled truthful
population.
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C. Differential Privacy Guarantee
XYZ Privacy satisfies differential privacy as we show in
this section. We first examine the binary value mechanism
and then the multiple value mechanism. The definition of
differential privacy can be found in the Appendix A.
(Binary Value) The differential privacy leakage is measured
as the maximum ratio of the binary output space given the
underlying truthful answer is “Yes” and “No” respectively.
In round one, the output space “Yes” is slightly more
likely as the truthful response is sampled in addition to being
responded randomly. In round two, there is no privacy leakage
as both output space “Yes” and “No” are both equally likely
and indistinguishable given the truthful answer is either “Yes”
or “No” respectively.
Thus, we are interested in the privacy leakage of output 1
round 1 (11) as follows:
εDP = max
(
ln
(
Pr[11|“Yes”]
Pr[11|“No”]
)
, ln
(
Pr[11|“No”]
Pr[11|“Yes”]
))
(16)
Pr[11|“Yes”]
Pr[11|“No”] =
piV ′ +pis
piV ′
(17)
Pr[11|“No”]
Pr[11|“Yes”] =
piV ′
piV ′ +pis
(18)
εDP = max
(
ln
(
piV ′ +pis
piV ′
)
, ln
(
piV ′
piV ′ +pis
))
(19)
(Multiple (Simultaneous) Values) The differential privacy
leakage is measured as the maximum ratio of the multiple
output space given the underlying truthful answer is any
combination of two values of the output space of size V .
In round one, for any two outputs whereby a data owner
would not truthfully respond with those values, the outputs
are indistinguishable and there is no privacy leakage as the
response is chosen randomly. The only privacy leakage occurs
when the data owner truthfully responds for their output space.
For output V’, round 1 (V′1), the privacy leakage is as
follows:
εDP = max
(
ln
(
Pr[V ′1|V ′]
Pr[V ′1|¬V ′]
)
, ln
(
Pr[V ′1|¬V ′]
Pr[V ′1|V ′]
))
(20)
Pr[V ′1|V ′]
Pr[V ′1|¬V ′]
=
piV ′ +pis
piV ′
(21)
Pr[V ′1|¬V ′]
Pr[V ′1|V ′]
=
piV ′
piV ′ +pis
(22)
εDP = max
(
ln
(
piV ′ +pis
piV ′
)
, ln
(
piV ′
piV ′ +pis
))
(23)
In round two, again there is no privacy leakage for those
values the data owner would not truthfully respond as the
response is chosen randomly. The only privacy leakage occurs
for those sampled and selected data owners that do not
participate (effectively write 0).
For output V’, round 2 (V′2), the privacy leakage is as
follows:
εDP = max
(
ln
(
Pr[V ′2|V ′]
Pr[V ′2|¬V ′]
)
, ln
(
Pr[V ′2|¬V ′]
Pr[V ′2|V ′]
))
(24)
Pr[V ′2|V ′]
Pr[V ′2|¬V ′]
=
piV ′ −pis
piV ′
(25)
Pr[V ′2|¬V ′]
Pr[V ′2|V ′]
=
piV ′
piV ′ −pis
(26)
εDP = max
(
ln
(
piV ′ −pis
piV ′
)
, ln
(
piV ′
piV ′ −pis
))
(27)
We then take the maximum leakage of round 1 (Equa-
tion 23) and round 2 (Equation 27).
D. Calibrating Noise to Population Size
We now examine how to add privacy noise to the second
round independent of the first round. Our query expansion will
continue to add the “No” population which means that we must
calibrate the sampling rate to avoid incurring a large standard
error due to variance.
Thus, we calibrate the sampling rate standard deviation to
the expected population size. This means that when the query
expansion is being performed, some effort must be made to
estimate the target population size beforehand. However, in
cases a meaningful estimate is not able to be performed, the
issuer of the query will need to issue a probe query and then
issue the calibrated query.
(Round One) In the first round each data owner tosses a
three sided die with a sampling probability pis, piYes, and piNo.
Let pis be the sampling probability that the data owner is
forced to respond “Yes”. Let piNo be the probability that a data
owner randomly responds “No”. We are careful to calibrate
the sampling rate to reduce the standard deviation according
to the expected population size due to the query expansion and
expected subpopulations (Yes and No).
Round OneYes =
{
1 with probability pisYes1
0 with probability piNo
(28)
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Round OneNo =
{
1 with probability pisNo1
0 with probability piNo
(29)
At this point, privacy noise has been added and thus the
underlying truthful distribution is becoming distorted as the
number of non-truthful data owners participate. The distortion
makes it difficult to estimate the the underlying truthful distri-
bution as we have one equation and two variables (number of
truthful and non-truthful data owners).
Thus, we execute a second round. We conduct a fresh
sample again being careful to calibrate the sampling rate to
minimize the variance for each population enabling us to solve
for the truthful population estimate.
(Round Two) In the second round only the data owner
which was selected and sampled with probability pis does not
participate (effectively writes 0). The remaining data owners
stay with the responses from round one.
Round TwoYes =
{
1 with probability pisYes2
0 with probability piNo
(30)
Round TwoNo =
{
1 with probability pisNo2
0 with probability piNo
(31)
Now combining the second round with the first round we
obtain accurate estimations as we see below.
(Expected Values) We now formulate the expected values as
follows. The subscript refers to the round number. That is, 11
refers to output 1 and round 1. The first round of expected
values are:
E[11] = pisYes1 ×Yespop+pisNo1 ×Nopop
E[01] = piNo×TOTALpop
(32)
That is, both the Yespop and Nopop contribute both “Yes”
and “No” responses.
The second round of expected values are:
E[12] = pisYes2 ×Yespop+pisNo2 ×Nopop
E[02] = piNo×TOTALpop
(33)
That is, both the Yespop and Nopop contribute both “Yes”
and “No” responses.
(Estimator) We solve for the Yespop population by subtracting
round one by round two as follows. Let Private Sum“Yes”,1 refer
to the aggregated privatized counts for output space “Yes” and
round 1.
Yespop =
Private Sum“Yes”,1−Private Sum“Yes”,2
pis
(34)
That is, we subtract the privatized sum of output space
“Yes” round 1 from the output space “Yes” of round 2. The
result is the sampled “Yes” aggregate. We then obtain the
estimation by dividing by the sampling parameter.
We configure pisYes1 according to the desired pri-
vacy and accuracy tradeoff. However, we must configure
pisYes2 ,pisNo2 ,andpisNo2 to minimize the standard deviation as we
perform a fresh sample each round.
VI. PRIVATE DATA UPLOAD
We now describe the Function Secret Sharing (FSS) [5]
primitive and how it enables a nearly square root reduction of
the key size. We then introduce our parameter optimization to
achieve more than an order of magnitude improvement over
the default implementation.
A. Function Secret Sharing Background
Recall our earlier construction in Section IV-D whereby
data owners privately upload data into a distributed database
without any of the Z database operators learning into which
row a particular data owner wrote (assuming there is at least
one honest database operator that does not collude and there
are at least two honest data owners). Each data owner specifies
their upload data by uniformly at random selecting a row from
the database to write their message. This selection of a single
row a and writing a message m can be viewed as a point
function Fa whereby Fa(x) = m iff x == a and 0 otherwise.
The key idea of FSS to obtain the key size reduction is
the use of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) to compress the
key size. However, as we previously saw simply using a PRG
alone is not enough as it’s not computationally feasible to find
Z random seeds that cumulatively XORed together produce a
desired output. We can find Z−1 random seeds, cumulatively
XOR them together, then XOR with the desired output to find
the correction word bitstring needed to XOR with the seeds
to produce a desired output. It is this observation that multi-
party FSS exploits to achieve the nearly square root key size
reduction.
FSS addresses the issue of the correction word being the
length of the database (thus the key size the length of the
database) by the use of a special matrix. Indexing into the
matrix is done by using the lower and higher bits of the input
to lookup into the matrix. Each matrix row contains a set of
PRG seeds. The expansion of a particular subset of the PRG
seeds are then combined by XOR with the correction word.
The resultant bitstring is then the length of the correction word
and contains both the desired output as well as other random
noise. Using the higher order bits of a as a lookup into the
resultant bitstring will locate the desired output within the
resultant bitstring. All other inputs will produce random noise.
Thus, the cryptographic compression is achieved by the
using of the PRG combined with correction words with length
roughly the square root of the size of the database. Further
details can be found in the paper by Boyle et al [5].
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However, it turns out that by adjusting the length of the
correction words and number of PRG seeds greatly impacts
the performance of the FSS protocols. We now explain our
FSS parameter optimization.
B. Function Secret Sharing Optimization
FSS relies on symmetric cryptography. Thus, we utilize
AES in counter mode for the pseudorandom generator.
There are two symmetric cryptography overheads that FSS
incurs. The first is that the default FSS evaluation algorithm
repeatedly evaluates the same seeds multiple times. The only
difference between each evaluation is that different positions
of the seed expansion evaluation is used based on the input’s
lower bits. The second overhead is balancing the number of
seeds with seed expansions.
Our algorithm optimization is described in Algorithm VI-B
and Algorithm VI-B. The share generation algorithm VI-B, is
the same as described in [5]. The difference is in the share
evaluation. The default implementation performs 2n PRG seed
initializations. However, the full PRG evaluation is the same
for each value of γ ′. Thus, we need to perform ν PRG seed
initializations instead of repeating the same PRG evaluation.
We do one evaluate per δ , which means that we can reuse
the same evaluated output and just take different partitions for
varying γ . The default FSS version evaluates δ times the same
seeds in order to extract the differing γ sections.
Our second optimization is balancing the number of total
seeds generated and evaluated with the prg expansion length of
each seed. Increasing the length of the seed reduces the number
of total seeds required. It’s faster to expand a single side as
opposed to multiple expansions of differing seeds. However,
the cost is an increase in the length of the key size. Thus,
we chose our parameters by performing microbenchmarks to
understand the tradeoffs in.
Algorithm 1 Genpi(1λ ,x,y): Generate Shares
1: Let G : {0,1}λ −→ {0,1}mµ be a PRG
2: Let µ ← d2n/2×2p−1/2e. Let ν ← d2n/µe
3: Use the higher and lower bits of the input x as a pair
x = (γ ′,δ ′), γ ′ ∈ dνe δ ′ ∈ dµe
4: Choose ν arrays A1, ...,Aν s.t. Aγ ∈R Op and Aγ ′ ∈R Ep for
all γ ′ 6= γ
5: Choose 2p−1 random strings cw1, ...,cw2p−1 ∈ 0,1mµ s.t.⊕2p−1
j=1 (cw j⊕G(sγ, j)) = eδ ·b
6: Set σi,γ ′ ← (sγ ′,1 ·Aγ ′[i,1]) ‖ ... ‖ (sγ ′,2p−1 ·Aγ ′[i,2p−1]) for
all 1 ≤ i≤ p, 1 ≤ γ ′ ≤ ν .
7: Set σi = σi,1 ‖ ... ‖ ...σi,ν for 1 ≤ i≤ p
8: Let ki = (σi ‖ cw1 ‖ ... ‖ cw2p−1) for 1 ≤ i≤ p
9: Return (ki, ...,kp)
VII. POLLUTION PROTECTION
In order to guard the private writes against a single data
owner writing to multiple rows, we utilize a novel and efficient
FSS share verification technique (which does not require any
public-key primitives) that is performed by the aggregation
parties [6]. The FSS share verification ensures that each data
owner writes a unit vector (i.e., a single row). Details of
Algorithm 2 EvaluateSharepi(ki): Evaluate Share
1: Let µ ← d2n/2×2p−1/2e. Let ν ← d2n/µe
2: Use the higher and lower bits of the input x as a pair
x = (γ ′,δ ′), γ ′ ∈ dνe δ ′ ∈ dµe
3: for j = 1, ...,ν do
4: y j← Eval( j,ki)
5: Let result j← (y j[1] ‖ ... ‖ y j[µ])
6: end for
7: Return (result1, ...,resultν)
Algorithm 3 Evalpi(ν ′,ki)
1: Let G : {0,1}λ −→ {0,1}mµ be a PRG
2: Parse ki as ki = (σi,cwi, ...,cw2p−1)
3: Parse σi as σi = s1,1 ‖ ... ‖ s1,2p−1 ‖ ... ‖ sν ,2p−1
4: Let yi←⊕1≤ j≤2p−1(cw j⊕G(sγ ′, j)) where sγ ′, j 6= 0
5: Return yi
the MPC technique can be found in the Appendix B. Our
evaluation results can be found in Section VIII-C.
Next, to prevent a single answer, such as a large number,
from distorting the aggregate sum, we utilize a bit vector
response which limits the data owner to only replying “No”
(’0’) or “Yes” (’1’).
Finally, data owners are authenticated to prevent Sybils and
multiple responses within a single epoch. The authentication
does not allow the aggregators to learn which row a data owner
is writing to. Each data owner performs a cryptographic private
write that is protected as long as there is at least one honest
aggregator who does not collude (as we previously shown in
Section VI).
Defining the error threshold for the number of malicious
data owners who falsify their responses (i.e., intentionally an-
swering “No” instead of “Yes”) is not considered in this work.
However, efficient techniques exist which ensure commitment
to the randomized response protocol [25].
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Figure 3. (Vehicle counts) XYZ Privacy Each vehicle reports it’s current
location.
VIII. EVALUATION
We evaluate the accuracy of the XYZ Privacy mechanism.
Next, we describe the performance gains of the FSS parameter
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Figure 6. (Vehicle Speed Distribution) Lane 1 speed distribution.
optimization. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of the pollu-
tion protection technique.
A. Accuracy
(PeMS Data) We evaluate the XYZ Privacy mechanism over a
real dataset rather than with arbitrary distributions. We utilize
the California Transportation Dataset from magnetic pavement
sensors[7] collected in LA\Ventura California freeways [8].
There are a total of 3,865 stations and 999,359 vehicles total.
We assign virtual identities to each vehicle. Each vehicle
announces the station it is currently at. We select a single
popular highway station. Every vehicle at the station reports
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Figure 7. (Vehicle Speed Distribution) Lane 1 speed distribution over 10,000
vehicles (only 354 are currently amongst the queried 3 lanes).
“Yes” while every other vehicle in the population truthfully
reports “No”. We evaluate over a 24 hour time period. XYZ
Privacy 1 has a sampling parameter of 45% and XYZ Privacy 2
has a sampling parameter of 25%. The randomized response
mechanism has pi1 = 0.8 and pi2 = 0.2.
Figure 3 compares the XYZ Privacy mechanism with the
Randomized Response mechanism. XYZ Privacy is able to
maintain constant error even at 1 million vehicles, while the
Randomized Response quickly incurs error. Upper bounds are
shown with a 95% confidence interval.
We next examine the vehicle speed distribution across the
freeways at evening rush hour. Figure 6 is with the population
at the specific stretch of the freeway. Figure 7 expands the
query population to 10,000 vehicles (9,646) are not at the
particular freeway stretch being monitored. The figures show
the speed distribution whereby there are 10 groups for the
following speeds “1− 10” is group 1, “11− 20” is group 2,
etc. Upper bounds are shown with a 95% confidence interval.
(Heart Data) We next evaluate over medical data. We utilize
the UCI open data repository [28] for heart related data.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the number of afflicted data owners
with a particular type of chest pain. The four types of chest
pain are typical angina, atypical angina, non-anginal pain,
and asymptomatic. Each group corresponds to a particular
chest pain and gender for a total of eight groups. Figure 5
scales the population to 10,000 whereby 303 are the original
dataset and the remaining 9,697 data owners provide chaff.
The XYZ Privacy mechanism maintains constant error and the
randomized response quickly incurs error. Upper bounds are
shown with a 95% confidence interval.
B. Privacy
Figure 11 evaluates the privacy leakage comparing XYZ
Privacy and the Randomized Response mechanism. XYZ Pri-
vacy uses the equation defined in V-C to measure the privacy
leakage. The Randomized Response mechanism privacy leak-
age is defined in the Appendix A-A.
The coin toss parameters used in Figure 11 has Random-
ized Response f lip1 = 0.8 and f lip2 = 0.2. XYZ Privacy has
a sampling parameter of 0.45. We could increase the value
of the randomized response f lip2 though the absolute error
would grow even larger than show in Figure 3.
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C. Scalability
FSS Optimization We evaluate our implementation of non-
attributable writes on Amazon EC2 with c4.2xlarge instances
to understand the impact of our optimization of the Function
Secret Sharing primitive.
We first perform a microbenchmark to evaluate the im-
provement of our optimization of evaluating shares to be
performed by the aggregators. Figure 8 shows our microbench-
mark for the 3 party and 5 party case. Our microbenchmark
shows several orders of magnitude improvement over of the
default implementation.
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Figure 11. (Privacy Leakage) XYZ Privacy compared with Randomized
Response privacy leakage as the coin toss probability increases. Higher epsilon
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Figure 13. MPC Verification Benchmark.
We then evaluate the generation of shares. We evaluate
the trade-off of key size by expanding a single seed versus
expanding multiple seeds with a smaller length. Figure 9 shows
the effect of the FSS optimization on the time to generate
shares. We achieve close to half a reduction in share generation
time.
We next evaluate our evaluation optimization on Amazon
EC2. Figure 10 shows the effect of applying the FSS op-
timization for the evaluation of the shares as described in
Section VI-B. We are able to achieve an order of magnitude
improvement over the default implementation.
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Share Verification. We now discuss the evaluation of our
implementation of the FSS share verification [6]. The three
algorithms for creating the blinding structure are “square”,
“product”, and “inverse” (see Appendix B for more details).
Figure 13 shows the scalability of the blinding operations.
“Product” is slightly faster than “square” as “product” must
only do(p− 1) multiplications, while “square” does (p− 1)
exponent operations. “Inverse” is the slowest as it performs
(p− 1) multiplications and then a finite field inverse, where
p is the number of parties. The MPC verification performed
by the aggregation servers is on the order of a couple hundred
milliseconds and is extremely efficient.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the XYZ Privacy mechanism
and demonstrate how to i) improve the privacy strength while
preserving utility, ii) achieve scalable non-attributable writes,
and iii) provide protection against pollution attacks whereby a
single data owner may attempt to corrupt the entire database.
To demonstrate its real-world applicability and practicality,
the XYZ Privacy mechanism was implemented on Amazon’s
AWS cloud and shown to scalably achieve these properties.
We believe this represents an important and timely advance
towards open and shared Internet of Vehicles data.
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APPENDIX A
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy has become the gold standard privacy
mechanism which ensures that the output of a sanitization
mechanism does not violate the privacy of any individual
inputs.
Definition 1 ([12], [15]): (ε-Differential Privacy). A pri-
vacy mechanism San() provides ε-differential privacy if, for
all datasets D1 and D2 differing on at most one record (i.e., the
Hamming distance H() is H(D1,D2)≤ 1), and for all outputs
O⊆ Range(San()):
sup
D1,D2
Pr[San(D1) ∈ O]
Pr[San(D2) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ε) (35)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechanism San
produces a given output is almost independent of the pres-
ence or absence of any individual record in the dataset. The
closer the distributions are (i.e., smaller ε), the stronger the
privacy guarantees become and vice versa. That is, a larger ε
means that the two dataset distribution are far apart and leaks
more information. A single record will induce distinguishable
output fluctuations. We desire smaller ε values to induce ε
indistinguishability.
A. Randomized Response Privacy Guarantee
1) Privacy Guarantee of Randomized Response: The ran-
domized response mechanism achieves ε-differential privacy,
where:
ε =max
(
ln
(Pr[Resp=‘Yes’ |‘Yes’]
Pr[Resp=‘Yes’ |‘No’]
)
, ln
( Pr[Resp=‘Yes’ |‘No’]
Pr[Resp=‘Yes’ |‘Yes’]
))
More specifically, the randomized response mecha-
nism [18] achieves ε-differential privacy, where:
ε = ln
(pi1+(1−pi1)×pi2
(1−pi1)×pi2
)
(36)
That is, if a data owner has the sensitive attribute A, then
the randomized answer will be “Yes” with the probability of
‘pi1 +(1−pi1)×pi2’. Else, if a data owner does not have the
sensitive attribute, then the randomized answer will become
“Yes” with the probability of ‘(1−pi1)×pi2’.
APPENDIX B
SHARE VERIFICATION
We now describe the MPC protocol [6] run amongst the
aggregator parties to verify all data owner shares. The protocol
does not violate data owner privacy and is extremely efficient
as it does not utilize any publick-key primitives and relies
solely on finite field operations.
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We first describe the MPC protocol in detail and then
provide an example.
MPC Protocol Let p represent the number of parties
participating in the protocol.
Let n represent the unit vector length (e.g., length of the
bit string or number of database slots).
Let m represent the number of bits of the message M. Let
M ∈ FZ where Z is a relatively large prime number.
Given FZ a finite field of characteristic Z where Z is a
relatively large prime, let R be a blinding (randomization)
matrix where the the values in the first row are chosen
uniformly at random over 0, ...,Z−1.
This is a particular randomization matrix such that elements
of each row is raised to the power of the first row, where the
power is equivalent to the row number. There will be a total
of p rows, one for each party. That is,
R =
r1 r2 ... rnr21 r22 ... r2n... ... ... ...
rp1 r
p
2 ... r
p
n
 (37)
We wish to secretly share a unit vector and verify that the
shares correctly sum to the unit vector.
For example,
uˆ =
 0M...
0
 (38)
The value can be m bits taking on a value from the finite
field of character of characteristic p where p is a relatively
large prime.
To share uˆ, the user can randomly generate a total p vectors
Vi
Vi =
vi,1vi,2...
vi,n
 (39)
such that
p
∑
i=1
Vi = uˆ (40)
We then blind these values such that
p
∑
i=1
R ·Vi = R · uˆ (41)
Let’s describe an example where n = 2 and p = 3.
We know that sum of the vectors should equal the unit
vector. [
v1,1
v1,2
]
+
[
v2,1
v2,2
]
+
[
v3,1
v3,2
]
= uˆ (42)
We now apply the randomization (blinding) matrix.

r1 r2
r21 r
2
2
r31 r
3
2
 ·
[
v1,1
v1,2
]
+

r1 r2
r21 r
2
2
r31 r
3
2
 ·
[
v2,1
v2,2
]
+
r1 r2r21 r22
r31 r
3
2
 ·[v3,1v3,2
]
= R · uˆ
(43)

r1 · v1,1+ r2 · v1,2
r21 · v1,1+ r22 · v1,2
r31 · v1,1+ r32 · v1,2
+

r1 · v2,1+ r2 · v2,2
r21 · v2,1+ r22 · v2,2
r31 · v2,1+ r32 · v2,2
+
r1 · v3,1+ r2 · v3,2r21 · v3,1+ r22 · v3,2
r31 · v3,1+ r32 · v3,2
= R · uˆ
(44)

r1 (v1,1+ v2,1+ v3,1)+ r2 (v1,2+ v2,2+ v3,2)
r21 (v1,1+ v2,1+ v3,1)+ r
2
2 (v1,2+ v2,2+ v3,2)
r31 (v1,1+ v2,1+ v3,1)+ r
3
2 (v1,2+ v2,2+ v3,2)
 = R · uˆ (45)
Since the summation of the elements of a unit vector should
sum to zero, we can denote the value as follows a+ba2+b2
a3+b3
= R · uˆ (46)
From Equation 42 that the sum of the vectors is the unit
vector. Thus, we then know that if the shares are properly
formed that a and b should represent either all zeros or the
blinded message. Thus, (a+b)2−(a2+b2) = 0 and (a+b)3−
(a3+b3) = 0.
If a and b are both zero then the terms fall out.
In the case of only a or b being the blinded message the
terms fall out.
If both a and b are non-zero then the difference will be
a non-zero value. These shares are invalid and should be
discarded.
A. Alternate Algorithms
There are two alternate algorithms for the “square” algo-
rithm described above, which were also presented in [6]. The
same process is used, but the structure of the blidning matrix is
different, as well as the final check of R · uˆ. The first algorithm
is the “product” algorithm where
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R =
r1,1 r2,1 ... rn,1r1,2 r2,2 ... rn,2... ... ... ...
r1,p r2,p ... rn,p
 (47)
such that
∀i
p−1
∏
j=1
ri, j = ri,p (48)
Then, we can apply the bliding matrix to our vectors Vi,
to achieve the final result:
[a1+b1
a2+b2
a3+b3
]
= R · uˆ (49)
where
p−1
∏
i=1
(ai+bi) = ap+bp (50)
An Alternative scheme is the “inverse” algorithm, which
has a blinding matrix of
R =
r1,1 r2,1 ... rn,1r1,2 r2,2 ... rn,2... ... ... ...
r1,p r2,p ... rn,p
 (51)
such that
∀i
p
∏
j=1
ri, j = 1 (52)
Then,
[a1+b1
a2+b2
a3+b3
]
= R · uˆ (53)
where
p
∏
i=1
(ai+bi) = 1 (54)
B. Share Verification Analysis
Here we analyze the protocol to ensure that data owners’
responses are correctly formed unit vectors where all indexes
are zero except for only one index.
Correctness The protocol outputs whether the final answer
is a unit vector (i.e., all the indexes are zero except for one
location). If the vector is all zeroes then the sum will be zero.
If the answer is a unit vector then the blinded message terms
fall out leaving zero. If the vector is not a unit vector, the sum
will be non-zero and we can discard this share.
Privacy All parties only view their own input and the final
output. The blinding mechanism effectively masks the data
owners true value.
Fairness All parties which participate will all view the
same final answer as the shares sum to the same value.
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